ssl_sni
Fact — official short description: “Sets whether to interpret SNI extensions in SSL connections.”
Identity
Lifecycle
| Fact | Value |
|---|---|
| First observed | PG19 Beta 3 |
| Present in | PG19 Beta 3 |
| Removed in | No |
| Introduction commit | 4f433025f666 — ssl: Serverside SNI support for libpq |
| Commit date | 2026-03-18 |
| Discussion | thread 1 |
Default history
| Versions | Raw boot_val |
Unit | Human value |
|---|---|---|---|
| PG19 Beta 3 | off |
— | off |
How it works
PostgreSQL describes ssl_sni as follows: “Sets whether to interpret SNI extensions in SSL connections.” A configuration reload applies the value to the server without a full restart. The atlas measures it in PG19 Beta 3; boot_val is the compiled or initialized baseline, not proof of a running cluster’s effective setting.
When enabled with TLS, PostgreSQL reads the client’s Server Name Indication and selects credentials through hosts_file. Hostnames match case-insensitively; /no_sni/ and * provide explicit fallback behavior. Certificate identity, client verification, CRLs, permissions, and reload failures still require independent validation.
Read it together with hosts_file, ssl, ssl_cert_file, ssl_key_file. Check SHOW and pg_settings on the target server, verify the source and pending_restart fields, and compare workload, logs, and resource metrics before and after any change.
Tuning advice
Advice. These are workload-specific starting points and must be validated with measurements.
| Workload | Guidance |
|---|---|
| OLTP | Roll out through staged clients, validate certificate selection and expiry warnings, and monitor authentication failures. Keep a tested fallback and treat file permissions and secret rotation as part of the same change. |
| OLAP | Apply the same security policy to batch drivers and long-lived ETL connections. Test clients that omit SNI, credential-expiry automation, reload behavior, and certificate-chain compatibility. |
| Small nodes | Prefer a simple, documented TLS and credential policy. Do not enable multi-certificate routing without a test for every hostname and fallback path, and never weaken verification to hide configuration mistakes. |
Pigsty
Values use the fixed 8-vCPU, 32-GiB, 100-GiB SSD fixture and render the current Pigsty templates for PG19 Beta 3; this does not assert current Pigsty support for that historical or beta release.
| Template | Effective value | Versus upstream boot | Source expression |
|---|---|---|---|
| OLTP | Unmodified | — | — |
| OLAP | Unmodified | — | — |
| CRIT | Unmodified | — | — |
| TINY | Unmodified | — | — |
Advice — pending human review. Fact from the current Pigsty template projection: OLTP: PG19 Beta 3 unmodified; OLAP: PG19 Beta 3 unmodified; CRIT: PG19 Beta 3 unmodified; TINY: PG19 Beta 3 unmodified. No Pigsty-specific rationale is inferred from an absent override.
Common pitfalls
- Treating the measured boot_val for ssl_sni as proof of the effective value on an initialized or managed cluster.
- Applying a change as though it were immediate while pg_settings reports sighup context.
- Changing this setting in isolation without checking the linked limits, observability, and rollback path.
- Depending on beta behavior in production without retesting the PostgreSQL 19 final release.
Related parameters
hosts_file · ssl · ssl_cert_file · ssl_key_file · ssl_ca_file